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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
TONY 
B Y ----
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
ROBERT HARVEY CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06-cv-02389
-vs- JUDGE DRELL
WAL-MART LOUISIANA L.L.C. MAGISTRATE JUDGE KIRK
R U L I N G
Pending is the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of 
the plaintiffs claims under (1) 29 U.S.C. § 2614 of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
( “FMLA”), (2) the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and 
(3) the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law ( “LEDL” ), La. R.S. 23:323(B)(2), 
Louisiana’s statutory parallel to the ADA.* 1
For the reasons described below, summary judgment with regard to the 
defendant' s dis ability discrimination claims under federal and state law is inappropriate 
at this stage of the litigation. Therefore, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
is DENIED IN PART as to the plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and the LEDL as to 
whether or not the plaintiff was disabled with regard to the major life activities of lifting,
1
The similarity between the AD A  and the LEDL has been noted by the Fifth Circuit. Jenkins v. Cleco 
Power. ,LLC. 487 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2007). The filings submitted by both parties cite cases related 
to and provisions of the ADA, and the Court in this ruling will do the same. Nonetheless, the 
arguments referenced in this opinion, and the Court’s rulings with regard to the ADA, will apply 
equally to the LEDL claim as well.
bending, and standing. However, the Court notes its reservations in so ruling, as the 
plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination rest upon a very tenuous foundation.
The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART as to the 
plaintiff’s claim under the FMLA, because the Court finds that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was an “eligible employee” under the terms 
of that statute.
I. Background
The plaintiff, Robert Harvey (“Mr. Harvey” ), was employed by the defendant, 
Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C. ( “Wal-Mart"), beginning in July 2002.2 (Doc. 39-4, pp. 9-10). 
Initially, Mr. Harvey was an overnight maintenance worker at the Monroe, Louisiana 
Wal-Mart location. He later worked as a “people greeter" until he retired from Wal-Mart 
in April 2006.
Mr. Harvey suffered from degenerative arthritis in his lower back. In April 2003, 
Mr. Harvey was involved in a motor vehicle accident, which aggravated his pre-existing 
condition by, according to his treating physician, causing “ a lumbar and cervical strain. ’’ 
(Doc. 44-8, p. 14).3 The aggravation of his condition, and the resulting increase in pain, 
led Mr. Harvey to request a change in his employment role. (Doc. 39-4, pp. 10-11). 
Mr. Harvey’s request was approved by his manager at the time, Scott Polk ( “Mr. Polk"), 
and he was assigned to a new position as a greeter. Mr. Harvey also desired to take
2
The Court is aware that the plaintiff also worked at another Wal-Mart location in Germantown, 
Tennessee, beginning in 2001. The details of his employment at that location are not relevant to this 
lawsuit.
Mr. Harvey’s medical condition will be discussed in more detail below.
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short breaks from standing during his shifts, which caused him substantial pain in his 
back. Mr. Harvey was, however, informed that he would have to submit medical 
documentation to support his request for an accommodation. Shortly after the accident, 
Mr. Polk obtained a note from his treating orthopedist, who recommended that 
Mr. Harvey be allowed to sit while at work for 5 minutes each hour. Thereafter, Mr. Polk 
approved of this accommodation.4
Mr. Harvey’s employment at Wal-Mart continued without incident until, in 
December 2004, he was asked to lift a heavy box. Mr. Harvey explained that he could 
not perform duties that required heavy lifting, and spoke with Mr. Polk about this issue. 
Mr. Polk requested that the plaintiff obtain another doctor's note which extended his 
physical restrictions to heavy lifting. Mr. Harvey once again visited his physician, and 
obtained a note which restricted him from lifting more than 25 pounds, bending, and 
standing for prolonged periods of time. Once again, Mr. Polk received the medical 
documentation, which was added to Mr. Harvey’s personnel file, and approved of the 
accommodation. Despite Mr. Harvey’s treatment and the accommodations provided to 
him by his supervisor, his condition continued to cause him significant pain.
Mr. Harvey took two leaves of absence in 2005, both of which are at issue in this 
case. The first leave of absence began on February 22, and ended on April 12. 
Mr. Harvey took this leave because he was experiencing a great deal of back pain, and 
he wanted to consider whether or not to undergo a surgery to attempt to correct the 
problem. Because no surgery had been ordered at that time, Mr. Harvey was unable to
Again, the medical restrictions imposed upon Mr. Harvey as a result of his condition will be explored 
much further during the course of this opinion.
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obtain a doctor’s excuse for this leave. Thus, it was characterized as “personal" leave, 
instead of “medical" leave. He ultimately decided not to have the surgery, and returned 
to work as scheduled. The second leave of absence began on September 1, and was 
scheduled to end on November 19. Mr. Harvey requested to return to work twelve days 
early, on November 7, but this request was denied, and he was not allowed to return to 
work until December 13, 2005.
Mr. Harvey took this second leave of absence to care for his daughter, Paige 
Nettles, who was suffering from intracranial hypertension, which inhibited her ability 
to care for her two minor children. Ms. Nettles was approximately 38 years old at the 
time, and her condition improved more rapidly than expected. Upon returning to work, 
Mr. Harvey claims that he was told by his new supervisor, John Pryor ( “Mr. Pryor") that 
he had exceeded the maximum amount of protected leave under federal law, and 
therefore, the company was not obligated to restore him to his former position. 
Mr. Harvey was not granted back pay for the time during which he had not been 
restored to his position as a greeter, a six-week period. This prompted the plaintiff to 
begin investigating Wal-Mart’s leave policy and the provisions of the FMLA. He then 
contacted Mr. Pryor, asserting that he was entitled to back pay under the FMLA. 
Although Wal-Mart denied that he was entitled to any back pay, Mr. Pryor was able to 
restore Mr. Harvey to his previous position as a greeter.
Also after returning from his second leave of absence, Mr. Harvey began to 
experience some resistance from his new supervisor regarding his accommodation he 
believed he needed. Mr. Pryor required that Mr. Harvey return to a physician, update his
4
personnel file with new medical correspondence, and fill out Wal-Mart’s “ADA 
Reasonable Accommodation Package” in order to be granted his desired 
accommodation. Instead of doing so, Mr. Harvey elected to retire in April 2006, claiming 
that he was no longer able to work with the severe back pain that he suffered from 
standing for long periods of time.
Mr. Harvey filed suit against Wal-Mart on November 3, 2006, in the 4th Judicial 
District Court for the Ouachita Parish, Louisiana. (Doc. 3). In this original petition, 
Mr. Harvey asserted that Wal-Mart’s conduct violated the FMLA, the ADA, and the 
LEDL. Wal-Mart filed a notice of removal on December 20, 2006, relying both upon 
federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 5).
Now before the Court is Wal-Mart’s Motion for Summary Judgment, in which 
Wal-Mart argues:
(1) as to Mr. Harvey’s disability discrimination claim under the ADA, Mr. Harvey 
cannot satisfy his initialprima facie burden of proving that he was disabled at the 
time of the alleged discrimination;
(2) as to Mr. Harvey’s FMLA claim, Mr. Harvey (a) cannot prove that he met the 
statutory requirement of having worked a sufficient number of hours to be 
considered an “eligible employee,” and (b) did not take his second leave of 
absence in 2005 for a reason protected by the FMLA; and
(3) as to Mr. Harvey’s state-law disability discrimination claim, the similarity 
between the provisions of the ADA and the LEDL implies that Mr. Harvey's state 
law claims should fail for the same reason given as to his federal claim.5
II. Law and Analysis
Moreover, the defendant also claims Mr. Harvey has failed to establish that an adverse employment 
actions was taken against him, which is another essential element of the plaintiff's disability 
discrimination claim under federal and state law.
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A. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the Court will grant a party’s motion 
for summary judgment only if:
the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A  genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is such that 
a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
In conducting this analysis, the Court must construe “all of the evidence and all 
of the factual inferences from the evidence . . .  in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.” Klina Realty Co., Inc, v. Chevron USA, Inc.. 575 F.3d 510, 517 (5th 
Cir. 2009). Any doubts are likewise resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. U.S. exrel. 
Lonqhi v. United States. 575 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 2009). Once the party seeking 
summary judgment has directed the Court's attention to portions of the record which 
reflect an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party bears the 
burden of demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Unitd States v. 
$92,203.00 in U. S. Currency. 537 F.3d 504, 506-07 (5th Cir. 2008). “However, mere 
conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and such 
allegations are insufficient, therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Eason 
v. Thaler. 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. Governing Law Under the Disability Discrimination Claim
6
There is some dispute between the parties concerning the applicability of the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“AD AAA”) to this case. Wal-Mart argues that the act 
was intended to apply prospectively only, and therefore, this dispute would be governed 
by the former, more restrictive interpretations of the ADA. Mr. Harvey maintains that the 
ADAAA (and its more lenient interpretations of the ADA) should be applied to this 
lawsuit, both because this action will be decided after the effective date of the statute, 
and because the language underpinning the statute indicates a congressional intent to 
correct erroneous interpretations of the ADA.
This argument can be settled quickly. The ADAAA became effective on January 
1,2009, and was intended, in the broadest sense, “ [t]o restore the intent and protections 
ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.” Pub. L. No. 110-325,122 Stat. 3553, 3559 
(2008).6 More narrowly, one of the stated purposes of the AD AAA that would perhaps 
have bearing on this case is to repudiate the “inappropriately high level of limitation 
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA” which followed the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky., Inc, v. Williams. 534 U.S. 184 
(2002). Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008).
However, the Fifth Circuit has held, unambiguously, that the provisions of the 
ADAAA “do not apply retroactively. ” EEOC v. Aaro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.. 511 U.S. 298, 313 (1994) ("’Even 
when Congress intends to supersede a rule of law embodied in one of our decisions
6 Counsel for Mr. Harvey asserts that this language embodies the true intent of the legislation, which 
should justify its application to cases such as the one before the Court. Although the former statement 
is viable, the latter is not, because neither this language, nor any other clause in the enactment 
sanctions retroactive application of the statute.
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with what it views as a better rule established in earlier decisions, its intent to reach
conduct preceding the 'corrective' amendment must clearly appear.’")). In accord, other 
district courts in our circuit have refused to apply the amendments to the ADA 
retroactively in cases decided after January 1, 2009, where the events giving rise to the 
cause of action occurred prior to the effective date of the legislation. See Moore v. Strain. 
No. 08-3913, 2009 WL 1565862, at *1, 3 (E.D. La. June 2, 2009); Picard v. St. Tammanv 
Parish Host).. 611 F. Supp. 2d 608, 610, 614 (E.D. La. 2009).
Likewise, in this case, the alleged acts of discrimination by Wal-Mart occurred 
during the term of Mr. Harvey’s employment, which ended in 2006. The bulk of the 
events in dispute took place between 2005 and 2006, approximately three years prior to 
the effective date of the ADAAA. Considering these facts, and the clear precedent 
before the Court, arguments concerning the propriety of retroactively applying new 
legislation are essentially moot. Thus, as instructed by the Fifth Circuit, the Court will 
apply the law as it stood prior to the effective date of the ADAAA, both to this motion 
and to any further proceedings in this litigation.
C. Mr. Harvey’s Federal and State Law Disability Discrimination Claims
1. Is Mr. Harvey “Disabled” Under the ADA?
Wal-Mart first contends that Mr. Harvey cannot establish that he was, by 
definition, “disabled” under the ADA, which is a prima facie element of his disability 
discrimination claim. More specifically, Wal-Mart claims Mr. Harvey cannot prove that 
his supposed impairment substantially limited a major life activity, that he had a record 
of such an impairment, or that he was regarded by Wal-Mart as having such an
8
impairment, because the basic limitation imposed upon Mr. Harvey by his condition was 
a need to avoid standing for prolonged periods of time. This limitation, according to Wal- 
Mart, was insufficient to constitute a “disability” under the ADA.
Mr. Harvey argues in response that his degenerative arthritis constituted a 
disability under the ADA, because the condition impaired his ability to perform various 
major life activities such as lifting, bending, and standing,, and because these 
restrictions precluded him from participating in a broad class of jobs.
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating “against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability." 42U.S.C.§ 12112(a) (2005). In order to succeed on 
a disability discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that “ (1) he has 
a ‘disability,’ (2) he is ‘qualified’ for the position in which he seeks employment, and (3) 
he was ‘discriminated’ against solely because of his disability. ” Gonzales v. City of New 
Braunfels. 176 F.3d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, Wal-Mart takes issue with 
Mr. Harvey’s claims primarily under the first element, although there is some discussion 
of the third element as well.
The term “disability” was given a three-pronged definition in the ADA:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Subsection (A) of this definition is the one principally at issue in 
this case, although, again, scant arguments were made by the parties as to the other 
elements of the definition.
9
Viewing subsection (A) at its component level, Mr. Harvey must establish that his 
degenerative arthritis constitutes a “physical... impairment," that "substantially limits” 
a “major life activity." Id. There is no contention that arthritic conditions may fairly be 
considered physical impairments. Moreover, Wal-Mart cannot seriously dispute that 
Mr. Harvey’s condition affects, at least to some extent, major life activities.7 According 
to Mr. Harvey’s medical records, his degenerative arthritis prompted physicians to order 
various restrictions on his physical activities, including “no lifting greater than 25 
pounds, no bending . .. avoid[] prolonged standing,” and an allowance of “five minutes 
time off his feet each hour. ” (Doc. 44-8, pp. 10,13). The Fifth Circuit has held that “while 
not specifically listed in the EEOC regulations, ‘major life activities could include lifting, 
reaching, sitting, or standing.” ' Jenkins v. Cleco Power LLC. 487 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 
2007) (quoting Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding. 53 F.3d 723, 725 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
Working, moreover, is a well-recognized example of a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(i). Clearly, the activities impacted by Mr. Harvey’s condition constitute major 
life activities.
Finally, a “substantial limitation” as to a major life activity exists when the 
affected individual is either:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the 
general population can perform; or
7 Counsel for Wal-Mart cites Coats v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. No. 02-21286, 2003 W L 21145732, at 
* 1 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 2003) for the supposed proposition that lifting, pushing, and pulling are not major 
life activities. The opinion simply does not contain that proposition. Rather, the court held that certain 
restrictions imposed upon the plaintiff in the case caused by back problems did not amount to a 
substantial limitation on any major life activity. See id.
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(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under 
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as 
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average 
person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.
Id. § 1630.2(j)(l). Courts should consider several factors in deciding whether a
“substantial limitation” is present, including: “ (i) The nature and severity of the
impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or
resulting from the impairment.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(2). This assessment must take place on
an individualized basis, taking into account any mitigating measures employed by the
plaintiff. Aaro Distrib.. 555 F.3d at 470.
In this case, Mr. Harvey’s purported limitations stemmed only from the 
degenerative arthritis condition in his lower back. Mr. Harvey’s medical records reflect 
that he had suffered from pain in his lower back and right leg for at least two decades. 
(Doc. 44-8, p. 8). Orthopaedic examinations conducted in 2003, a few  months after his 
car accident, made clear that his condition necessitated a change in his job function at 
that point. (Doc. 44-8, p. 11).
Mr. Harvey’s condition has been characterized by Mr. Harvey’s his treating 
physicians as “a degenerative spine,” "degenerative disc disease,” and “degenerative 
arthritis." E arly examinations following shortly after his car accident showed “extensive 
degenerative changes” to his lumbar spine. (Doc.44-8, p. 14). This condition prompted 
Mr. Harvey’s orthopaedist to recommend the physical restrictions, which again included 
lifting more than 25 pounds, bending, “prolonged standing,” and an allowance of five 
minutes of sitting time each hour. (Doc. 44-8, pp. 16-17). This evidence indicates that
11
the “nature and severity of the impairment” are, at least, arguably, significant. See Aqro 
Distrib.. 555 F.3d at 470.
More recent testing (conducted after Mr. Harvey’s retirement) revealed evidence 
of “congenital stenosis” affecting Mr. Harvey’s spine, with significant narrowing of the 
space between certain discs in his lower back. Mr. Harvey continued to complain of pain 
in his back well after his retirement, and had undergone various testing and treatment 
methods, including an epidural steroid injection. (Doc. 44-8, p. 2, 5-7). This condition 
clearly affected his ability to work at Wal-Mart, both as a greeter and certainly as a 
maintenance worker. In sum, Mr. Harvey’s degenerative arthritis condition seems, from 
the evidence presented, to have been a physical impairment from which he suffered 
years before he worked at Wal-Mart, and from which he will continue to suffer 
indefinitely. Therefore, Mr. Harvey’s condition seems to find some support in the two 
temporal factors discussed above as well. See Aqro Distrib.. 555 F.3d at 470.
However, as Wal-Mart pointed out, the effects of Mr. Harvey’s condition were not 
totally consistent; he was able to stand at work for more time than was recommended 
on some occasions, and less on others. (Doc. 39-4, pp. 30-31). As a greeter, Mr. Harvey 
was standing much more than he was sitting, and was able to avoid sitting for long 
periods of time in many instances. (Doc. 39-4, pp. 34-36).8
0
Counsel for the defendant emphasized that Mr. Harvey picketed in front of Wal-Mart after he retired, 
carrying a large sign for 30-40 minutes, twice a day, during rush hour traffic. (Doc. 39-2, p. 4-5). This 
activity lasted for approximately 1 month. While the Court appreciates the import of this evidence, 
it is not sufficient to establish Wal-Mart's entitlement to summary judgment. Acknowledging that Mr. 
Harvey w as not completely incapacitated, and w as capable of picketing for consistent, although 
relatively short, periods of time, there still remains some dispute as to whether Mr. Harvey was 
disabled under the ADA.
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The question presented by this motion is whether Mr. Harvey has pointed to 
sufficient evidence in the record to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
he is substantially limited in the major life activities of (1) lifting, bending, and standing; 
and (2) working. The term "substantial" is the key phrase in this analysis; it “precludes 
impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks 
from qualifying as disabilities.” Toyota. 534 U.S. at 197. The United States Supreme 
Court has used the terms "’considerable"' or "’to a large degree’" to qualify the meaning 
of the word “substantial” as it was applied prior to the enactment of the AD AAA. See 
id. at 196.
Whether Mr. Harvey’s limitations were “substantial” is a highly debatable 
proposition. The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this provision, in accord with the Supreme 
Court’s guidance, with exacting narrowness, upholding the grant summary judgment 
against a plaintiff who suffered from "’degenerative disc disease and degenerative facet 
joint disease’" which prohibited prolonged periods of standing or sitting, but allowed the 
plaintiff to sit or stand in one place “for up to one hour at a time." Dupre v. Charter 
Behavioral Health Svs. of Lafayette, Inc.. 242 F.3d 610, 611, 614 (5th Cir. 2001). The 
plaintiff’s ability to perform these major life activities was not, according to the court, 
“significantly restricted as compared with the average person. ” Id. at 614. In a similar 
decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against another plaintiff who 
claimed that, because he suffered from “degenerative disc disease,” he was “impaired 
in climbing stairs, walking, standing for longer than five minutes, sitting for longer than 
five minutes, with balance, and pain." Pearam v. Honeywell, Inc.. 361 F.3d 272, 286 (5th
13
Cir. 2004). Evidence that the employee was to “sit or stand for hours at a time” led the 
court to conclude that the restrictions were not “substantial” under the ADA. See id.
Some caution is warranted, however, because other limitations, not completely 
distinguishable from Mr. Harvey’s, have been found substantial. For instance, an 
employee whose leg fracture limited his ability “to sit for extended periods, ” which the 
evidence showed to be “up to three hours per day," was deemed disabled. Jenkins v. 
Cleco Power LLC. 487 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007). This limitation, the court found, was 
substantial because the plaintiffs “ability to sit [was] significantly more restricted than 
the average person. ” Id.
Overall, we must consider Mr. Harvey’s condition not by its name, classification, 
or against the backdrop of the limitations imposed upon others WITH similar restrictions, 
but rather, by its adverse impact on his life. Sutton v. United Air Lines. 527 U.S. 471,483 
(1999). Here, although there is evidence that Mr. Harvey was able to stand for hours at 
a time, at least on some occasions, there is also evidence that he was compelled to sit 
more than once per hour on other occasions. His limitations were admittedly 
inconsistent, but arguably more restrictive than the limitations affecting the average 
person. Mr. Harvey's condition was likewise a longstanding, and seemingly permanent
Qone.
This “room for argument" provides Mr. Harvey with an exceptionally narrow 
window to avoid summary judgment. The Court’s role at this stage is not to weigh the
In order to be considered substantial, the limitations imposed upon an individual must be “ ‘permanent 
or long-term."' Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198. Mr. Harvey's lower back problems existed well before his 
employment at Wal-Mart, and persisted well after he retired.
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merits of the plaintiffs claims; rather, it is to determine whether or not there is a genuine 
issue of material fact for trial. The Court is aware that “a mere scintilla [of evidence] is 
not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment, ’’ but the plaintiff’s evidence as to
whether he was substantially limited by his condition exceeds a “scintilla." Davis v. 
ChevronU.S.A., Inc.. 14F.3d 1082,1086 (5th Cir. 1994). Affording Mr. Harvey the benefit 
of any reasonable inferences, as we must, the Court is unable to conclude that summary 
judgment is appropriate as to whether he was “disabled” with regard to the major life 
activities of sitting, lifting, bending, and standing under the ADA. See Jenkins. 487 F.3d 
at 313-314.
Mr. Harvey also argues that he was substantially limited in the major life activity 
of working. The Supreme Court offered the following guidance for the analysis of a 
plaintiffs claims in this regard:
When the major life activity under consideration is that of working, the 
statutory phrase “substantially limits” requires, at a minimum, that 
plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs. Reflecting 
this requirement, the EEOC uses a specialized definition of the term 
“substantially limits” when referring to the major life activity of working:
“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person 
having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a 
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the 
major life activity of working.”
Sutton. 527 U.S. at 491 (citations omitted). The Court has also indicated that the 
availability of a “host of different types of jobs" precludes a finding that the employee 
is substantially limited with regard to the major life activity of working. Id. at 492.
15
Once again, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of this standard has been restrictive.
For example, the court held that when an employee was precluded from participating 
in jobs that required “driving, climbing, and heavy lifting," he was not substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working. Bavless v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.. No. 
02-50560, 2003 WL 21195495, at *4 (5th Cir. May 5, 2003). Similarly, the court found that 
an employee who suffered from "degenerative disc disease” was not disabled as to the 
major life activity of working, when “she was capable of bending at the knees, walking 
a half mile, lifting up to thirty pounds ... driving a car for an hour.... [and] was also able 
to sit and stand for up to an hour at a time. ” Dupre. 242 F.3d at 614-15. Numerous other 
decisions indicate that a plaintiff’s asserted inability to perform manual or heavy labor 
jobs is insufficient to establish a disability regarding the major life activity of working.10
In this case, Mr. Harvey contends that he is disabled “from the class of heavy 
labor jobs.” (Doc. 44-1, p. 7). He offers no evidence of what types or classes of jobs the 
restrictions placed upon him would actually preclude, other than the use of this general 
term. He cites no case in which the Fifth Circuit (or any court, for that matter) has found 
such a general categorization sufficient to establish a disability. He has offered the 
Court no evidence of a statement from a medical practitioner of any kind which officially 
“disables" him from a broad class or range of jobs - merely restrictions on his ability to
See, e.q.. Collins v. Saia Motor Freight Lines. Inc., No. 04-30958, 2005 W L 1140777, at *2 (5th Cir. May 
16,2005) (restriction on plaintiffs ability to consistently lift heavy weight was insufficient to establish 
a disability under the ADA); Watkins v. Roadway Express Inc.. 273 F.3d 1094, 1094 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(heavy lifting restriction limited plaintiff only with regard to “at most a ‘narrow range of jobs'”) 
(quoting Sherrod v. Am. Airlines. 132 F.3d 1112,1120 (5th Cir. 1998): Eldridae v. Am. Residential Svcs. 
L.L.C.. No. 3:04-CV-2073-D, 2006 W L 2035654, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2006) (plaintiffs medical 
restrictions on “lifting, kneeling, stooping, bending, or working on his knees for an extended period 
of time" did not limit plaintiff as to a broad class of jobs).
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lift, bend, reach, and stand. To the contrary, Mr. Harvey was able to find employment 
after retiring from Wal-Mart as a pizza delivery driver. The Court can conceive of a 
number of other classes of jobs, such as clerical or driving-related positions, which 
would not be affected by Mr. Harvey's physical limitations.
Given the narrow interpretations of the Fifth Circuit surrounding this particular 
major life activity, and the lack of specific evidence regarding a class of jobs from which 
the plaintiff is precluded by his physical condition, the Court finds that Wal-Mart is 
entitled to summary judgment as to this specific issue: Mr. Harvey is not substantially 
limited by his degenerative arthritis with regard to the major life activity of working.
2. Was Mr. Harvey “Regarded as" Disabled?
Mr. Harvey also asserted that Wal-Mart regarded him as disabled. The Court 
notes at the outset of this discussion that the arguments as to this point are highly 
underdeveloped. Nonetheless, because some evidence regarding Wal-Mart’s perception 
of Mr. Harvey's condition has been brought to the Court’s attention, w e will consider this 
issue briefly.
Under the ADA, the definition of the term “disability” includes “being regarded 
as having such an impairment [that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual].” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), (C). “A  plaintiff has a ‘regarded 
as’ disability if he (1) has an impairment that is not substantially limiting but which the 
employer perceives as substantially limiting, (2) has an impairment that is substantially 
limiting only because of the attitudes of others, or (3) has no impairment but is perceived 
by the employer as having a substantially limiting impairment.” Waldrip v. Gen. Elec.
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Co.. 325 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Goweskv v. Singing River Hosp. Svs.. 321 
F.3d 503 (5th Cir.2003)). The statements and actions of an employer's supervisors with 
decision-making power can be probative in determining whether an employer regarded 
an employee as being disabled. Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co.. 436 F.3d 468, 
476-77 (5th Cir. 2006) (relying upon statements of an employer’s “decisionmaker” in 
deciding whether or not the employer regarded the plaintiff as disabled).
In this case, Mr. Harvey asserts that, because he documented his condition with 
Wal-Mart supervisors, and had been granted accommodations in the past based upon 
that documentation, Wal-Mart regarded him as disabled. Wal-Mart characterizes this 
argument as a “red herring” which was asserted by Mr. Harvey “half-heartedly,” and 
claims there is no evidence that Mr. Harvey’s supervisor, Mr. Pryor, regarded him as 
disabled. (Doc. 49, p. 4. n.13).
The Court frankly agrees with Wal-Mart that Mr. Harvey’s argument on this point 
was “half-hearted. ” The Court also understands the Fifth Circuit’s position with regard 
to this standard to be as follows: “Under the ‘regarded as’ prong, the disability status 
of the plaintiff turns not on the plaintiffs physical condition, but rather on how the 
plaintiff was perceived and treated by those individuals alleged to have taken 
discriminatory action.” Peas v. River West, L.P.. 152 F.3d 471, 476 n.9 (5th Cir. 1998).
However, the Court cannot agree, at this stage of the argument’s rather slow 
evolution, that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Pryor 
regarded the plaintiff as disabled. Evidence before the Court indicates that Wal-Mart 
had long been aware of Mr. Harvey’s medical condition. In fact, Wal-Mart had received
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documentary proof that his condition imposed certain physical restrictions upon him,
and had granted Mr. Harvey an accommodation which addressed those physical 
restrictions.
Perhaps more interestingly, Mr. Pryor demanded that Mr. Harvey submit an1 ADA 
Reasonable Accommodation Package” when Mr. Harvey approached him about the 
accommodation granted to him by the previous supervisor, Mr. Polk. This was done 
because, according to Mr. Pryor's deposition testimony, when he received notice of 
Mr. Harvey’s original accommodation, “ [t]hey said it probably wasn’t on an ADA form. ” 
(Doc. 44-5, p. 29).
Ultimately, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether Mr. Pryor, the supervisor alleged to have discriminated against Mr. Harvey, 
regarded Mr. Harvey as being disabled under the ADA.
3. Did Wal-Mart Discriminate Against Mr. Harvey?
Wal-Mart’s also claims that no adverse employment action was taken against 
Mr. Harvey, because he chose to retire, and was neither terminated nor forced, in any 
way, to resign or retire. Mr. Harvey contends that he was nonetheless denied a 
reasonable accommodation, and was compelled to retire due to his discomfort with 
standing up at work, which caused him significant pain.
The AD A ’s definition of discrimination includes “not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations” of a disabled employee. 
42U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). This provision imposes upon an employer the affirmative duty 
to provide a reasonable accommodation to disabled employees “in regard to job
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application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. ” 
Id. § 12112(a).
Wal-Mart argues that Mr. Harvey has failed to provide evidence that he suffered
an “adverse [employment] action" as to a term or condition of his employment. (Doc. 39-
2, p. 8, n .ll). In support of this contention, Wal-Mart emphasizes that Mr. Harvey’s
employment ended due to his decision to retire, and that he failed to utilize Wal-Mart's
“open door policy” to obtain a final decision regarding his desired accommodations.
These arguments, however, misconstrue the relevant consideration under a failure to
accommodate claim under the ADA. However, an individual does not have to be
summarily terminated in order to establish that he or she was the target of
discrimination. As the above statutory language emphasizes, actionable discrimination
includes a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A). The focus of this inquiry is on the presence of an accommodation that
is “sufficient to meet the job-related needs of the individual being accommodated.”
Agro, 555 F.3d at 470 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App., § 1630.9). The denial of such a
reasonable accommodation is, in and of itself, proscribed activity:
It is unlawful for a covered entity not to make reasonable accommodation 
to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
applicant or employee with a disability, unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on 
the operation of its business.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.9.11
The parties have offered no arguments as to whether the accommodations requested by Mr. Harvey 
were reasonable.
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Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has recognized the importance of focusing upon an
employer’s failure to accommodate a disability, rather than whether an employee 
suffered an “adverse employment action.” See, e.g.. Bridges v. Dept, of Social Servs.. 
No. 00-30804, 2001 WL 502797, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 27, 2001) (holding that "[a]lthough 
[the plaintiff] has suffered no adverse employment action, she may still raise a claim of 
discrimination based on the alleged failure reasonably to accommodate her disability"). 
Relying upon the court’s reasoning in Bridges, another district court in our circuit 
recently held that “ [bjecause the failure to reasonably accommodate an employee's 
disability is, by definition, a failure to provide that employee with an equal employment 
opportunity, the Court holds that it is unnecessary to prove a separate ‘adverse 
employment action’ element in a failure to accommodate case." Picard. 611 F. Supp. 2d 
at 620. In that case, the plaintiff, a hospital transcriptionist who suffered from carpal 
tunnel syndrome and Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease, resigned after being denied the use 
of voice-recognition software by her employer. Id. at 610-12. The Court finds that these 
decisions accurately interpret the definition of the term "discriminate” in the ADA. 
Thus, if Mr. Harvey can raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was 
denied a reasonable accommodation, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
should be denied.
Although much of the onus rests with the employer under these provisions, Mr. 
Harvey, as an employee, bore a concomitant duty as well. Employees are responsible 
for making employers aware of any disabilities that they may have and the limitations 
arising from them, and to request reasonable accommodations. See Seaman v. CSPH,
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Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir.1999) ( “Because the ADA requires employers to
accommodate the limitations arising from a disability, and not the disability itself, an 
employee seeking to assert a disability discrimination claim must produce evidence that 
the employer knew not only of the employee's disability, but also of the physical or 
mental limitations resulting therefrom. ” ). Indeed, the statutory language proscribing an 
employer's failure to accommodate includes only the “known physical or mental 
limitations” of a disabled employee. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
In this case, Mr. Harvey provided Wal-Mart with two notes from physicians 
describing the physical limitations of his condition. As a result of these notes, Mr. 
Harvey was allowed to sit while working if it became necessary for him to do so, and 
was no longer required to participate in duties that required bending and heavy lifting. 
Thus, Wal-Mart was well aware of the limitations arising from Mr. Harvey’s physical 
condition. In addition, Mr. Harvey again requested permission to sit while working after 
being denied permission to do so following his second leave of absence. (Doc. 44-9, p. 
5). Therefore, Mr. Harvey has offered evidence which tends to show that he notified his 
employer of the limitations imposed upon him by his degenerative arthritis condition, 
and of requested a reasonable accommodation.
Wal-Mart’s arguments are further deficient because they ignore Mr. Harvey’s 
documented attempts to remedy the problem regarding his accommodation before 
retiring. Mr. Harvey did, indeed, choose to retire in April of 2006. However, Mr. Harvey 
was clear in his deposition testimony that, if his accommodation had been approved by 
Wal-Mart, he would not have chosen to retire. (Doc. 39-4, pp. 37-39). Mr. Harvey’s Exit
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Interview also evidences this point: the ‘‘Detailed Statement of Termination” section
states that Mr. Harvey retired because “ [h]e couldn’t stand for long period [sic] of time 
without causing him severe pain." (Doc. 44-10, p. 2).
Wal-Mart counters that a final decision as to whether to grant Mr. Harvey an 
accommodation had not been reached at the time that Mr. Harvey chose to retire. 
However, at the time that his request was submitted, Mr. Harvey’s new manager, 
Mr. Pryor, was aware that a prior accommodation had been granted. (Doc. 44-5, p. 28). 
Mr. Pryor reviewed Mr. Harvey's personnel file, which contained records of his 
degenerative arthritis condition and the restrictions placed upon him. Mr. Pryor 
suggested to Mr. Harvey that he return to the doctor to update his file and to fill out an 
“ADA Accommodation Package," but also stated that ADA accommodations were not 
required to be updated after 90 days (unlike, according to Mr. Pryor, workers’ 
compensation accommodations). Meanwhile, there was a period of some months during 
which Mr. Harvey was not allowed to sit while at work, and as a result, was forced to 
work while in substantial pain. Although Mr. Harvey admitted that Mr. Pryor was “still 
handling” his request, Mr. Harvey has submitted enough evidence to indicate that he 
may have been unlawfully denied a prior-approved reasonable accommodation, at least 
for some period of time. A  right of action may have arises upon that original denial.
This Court holds that Mr. Harvey need not have been terminated, demoted, or 
otherwise subjected to ridicule or harassment in order to state a viable discrimination 
claim under the ADA. Rather, he must merely raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether Wal-Mart did not provide a reasonable accommodation regarding his alleged
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disability. Although the evidence before the Court rests, once again, on very narrow 
footing, it is sufficient to survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
D. Mr. Harvey's FMLA Claim
Mr. Harvey asserts that he is entitled to recover damages and back pay under the 
FMLA, because Wal-Mart failed to timely restore him to his position following his second 
leave of absence in December 2005. Wal-Mart argues in response that it is entitled to 
summary judgment dismissing Mr. Harvey's FMLA claims for two reasons. First, Mr. 
Harvey did not work a sufficient number of hours during the twelve-month period prior 
to his second leave of absence to qualify as an "eligible employee” under the FMLA. 
Second, Wal-Mart maintains that the justification for Mr. Harvey’s September 2005 leave 
of absence, to care for his ill daughter and her children, was not a qualifying reason for 
such a leave under the FMLA, again excepting Mr. Harvey from the protections of the 
statute.
By contrast, Mr. Harvey claims that genuine issues of fact remain as to Wal-Mart's 
alleged violations of the FMLA. Remaining in dispute, according to Mr. Harvey, are the 
proper method and end result of calculating the hours worked by Mr. Harvey prior to his 
September 2005 leave of absence, and whether Wal-Mart should be equitably estopped 
from asserting a defense of non-coverage.
1. Equitable Estoppel
We must begin our analysis with the issue of estoppel, as Mr. Harvey’s argument 
here would preclude further discussion of many of the arguments contained in the
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parties’ filings. Mr. Harvey contends that Wal-Mart designated his second leave of 
absence as FMLA-qualifying leave, and that as a result of this misrepresentation, it 
should be equitably estopped from denying that he was an ‘‘eligible employee.” Wal- 
Mart challenges the viability of applying estoppel in this context, and specifically argues 
that, because Mr. Harvey was unaware of his rights under the FMLA until he returned 
from his second leave of absence, he cannot now claim that he relied upon any 
representations by Wal-Mart to his detriment. Therefore, Wal-Mart claims, the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel should not be used to salvage Mr. Harvey’s otherwise 
unsupportable FMLA claim.
The decisive point here is not whether Wal-Mart’s policy provided more generous 
amounts of leave than required under the FMLA. That issue was made effectively moot 
by the Fifth Circuit’s decision that, although an employer’s “policies are more generous 
in defining employee eligibility for FMLA protections, they do not create an FMLA cause 
of action.” Dolese v. Office Depot, Inc.. 231 F.3d 202, 202 (5th Cir. 2000). Rather, the 
issue is whether Wal-Mart's representation that Mr. Harvey’s second leave of absence 
fell under the FMLA warrants the application of equitable estoppel in this case.
The definition and elements of estoppel, as adopted by the Supreme Court, are as 
follows:
"If one person makes a definite misrepresentation of fact to another person 
having reason to believe that the other will rely upon it and the other in 
reasonable reliance upon it does an a c t. . . the first person is not entitled 
. . . (b) to regain property or its value that the other acquired by the act, if 
the other in reliance upon the misrepresentation and before discovery of 
the truth has so changed his position that it would be unjust to deprive him 
of that which he thus acquired.”
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Heckler v. Cmtv. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc.. 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 894(1) (1979)). The Fifth Circuit explicitly held that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable to claims under the FMLA:
[A]n employer who without intent to deceive makes a definite but 
erroneous representation to his employee that she is an "eligible employee" 
and entitled to leave under FMLA, and has reason to believe that the 
employee will rely upon it, may be estopped to assert a defense of 
non-coverage, if the employee reasonably relies on that representation and 
takes action thereon to her detriment.
Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc'ns, Inc.. 447 F.3d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 2006). In a 
subsequent opinion, the court interpreted its decision in Minard to imply the following 
requirement: “the defendant-employer must have actually represented to the 
plaintiff-employee that her leave was covered and/or that she was protected by the FMLA  
in order to equitably estop the defendant from arguing in court that the FMLA does not 
specifically cover the plaintiff-employee and/or her leave. ” Ford-Evans v. United Space 
Alliance LLC. No. 08-20033, 2009 WL 1344945, at *5 (5th Cir. May 14, 2009) (emphasis 
added).
In this case, there was, in fact, a designation on the "Request For Leave of 
Absence" form completed by Mr. Harvey, and approved by a supervisor, indicating that 
his second leave of absence was “counted as leave pursuant to the FMLA." (Doc. 44-11, 
p. 4). This designation, which is clearly printed on the bottom of the form and referenced 
by an asterisk, would suffice to constitute a “representation” in the general sense of that 
term. However, the Court finds that this language does not support Mr. Harvey’s 
equitable estoppel argument, for a number of reasons.
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supposed rights under the FMLA when he took his second leave of absence. Indeed, Mr.
Harvey was not aware that his second leave of absence was classified as FMLA-
protected until he reviewed the FMLA guidelines after returning from his second leave
of absence. (Doc. 39-4, pp. 25-26). To the contrary, when asked during his deposition
whether he understood that his second leave of absence was covered under the FMLA,
Mr. Harvey responded: “I didn’t know it. I do now, because it’s under it, but I didn’t
know at that time.” (Doc. 39-3, p. 26). It is thus logical to assume that Mr. Harvey did
not read the printed designation at the time that his request for the second leave of
absence was approved, and there is no evidence that he became aware of it by any other
means. Thus, there seems to be no dispute that Mr. Harvey did not rely upon any
representation made by Wal-Mart, in deciding to take his second leave of absence.12
This is a critical issue, because reliance upon a representation is an absolute and
consistent requirement of equitable estoppel. The Fifth Circuit was clear on this point
in applying the doctrine to FMLA claims:
The [Supreme] Court explained that the party claiming the estoppel must 
have relied on its adversary's conduct “ ‘in such a manner as to change his 
position for the worse.'” And, according to the Court, that reliance must 
have been reasonable in that the party claiming the estoppel did not know 
nor should it have known that its adversary's conduct was misleading.
First, Mr. Harvey rather candidly admitted that he was largely unaware of his
12 While the Court is aware that Mr. Harvey may have changed his plans before taking that second leave 
of absence if he had known of the FMLA implications of the leave. However, this issue is not 
controlling. Mr. Harvey w as given no false assurance, rooted in the FM LA or otherwise, that he would 
be entitled to anything at all upon returning from his second leave of absence. The lack of such an 
assurance is controlling in the determination of whether equitable estoppel applies.
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Minard. 447 F.3d at 358 (quoting Heckler. 467 U.S. at 59). The cases cited by the parties 
reflect the requirement as well. In Minard. for instance, the plaintiffs requested medical 
leave was approved by a memorandum from her employer which specifically stated that 
she was an “eligible employee" and that she was entitled to 12 weeks of protected leave 
under the FMLA. See id. at 354. This representation by the plaintiff’s employer justified 
the court's application of estoppel. See id. Conversely, in Ford-Evans. the court denied 
a plaintiffs equitable estoppel claim “because [the employer] did not make any 
representations to [the plaintiff] that her leave was protected by FMLA during the time 
of the relevant events at issue.” See 2009 WL 1344945, at *5. Without evidence of such 
a representation by a Wal-Mart supervisor, and with Mr. Harvey’s admission that he was 
unaware of the designation on his leave of absence form, the notion that Mr. Harvey 
relied to his detriment upon any position taken by Wal-Mart as to his rights under the 
FMLA is unsupported.
In addition, even if w e were to assume that Mr. Harvey did have some knowledge 
which would support estoppel, the representation contained in the leave of absence 
approval form was not that Mr. Harvey was an “eligible employee" under the FMLA, as 
was the case in Minard. 447 F.3d at 354. Rather, it was a general statement that the 
selected category of leave, which in this case was leave to care for an ill family member, 
was "counted as leave pursuant to the FMLA.’’13 (Doc. 44-11, p. 4). Although the form 
was approved by a Wal-Mart supervisor, this designation was pre-printed, not added
The emphasis here must be the distinction between the terms “counted as" and “covered by." 
Although this type of leave may have been designated as falling within a broad category under the 
FMLA, there is no representation that Mr. Harvey was, himself, covered.
13
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by the approving supervisor. Moreover, Mr. Harvey has not offered evidence which 
would tend to show that Wal-Mart made any other representation to him regarding his 
rights (or lack thereof) under the FMLA prior to taking his second leave of absence.
Had there been such a representation, or had Mr. Harvey relied in any way upon 
the designation in the leave of absence form prior to taking his second leave of absence, 
the Court's decision may have been different. However, after carefully reviewing the 
record as it stands, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Wal-Mart should be equitably estopped from asserting a defense of 
non-coverage under the FMLA.
2. Retaliation
Mr. Harvey also asserts that Wal-Mart retaliated against him because he
attempted to exercise his rights under the FMLA. The Fifth Circuit has offered the
following guidance regarding retaliation claims under the FMLA:
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA, the 
employee must show the following: 1) he was protected under the FMLA;
2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 3) he was treated less 
favorably than an employee who had not requested leave under the FMLA 
or the adverse decision was made because he sought protection under the 
FMLA.
Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth.. 446 F.3d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 2006); accord. Powers v. 
Woodlands Religious Cmtv. Inc.. No. 08-40709, 2009 WL 938938, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 
2009). The plaintiff need not prove that the exercise of FMLA rights was the sole cause 
of the unfavorable treatment; ‘‘ [t]he plaintiff is, however, required to show that the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action are not completely unrelated.” 
Mauder. 446 F.3d at 583.
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In this case, Mr. Harvey asserts that the causal connection between his exercise
of FMLA rights and the adverse employment action taken against him (the decision to 
renew investigation into his disability accommodation) was temporal. Basically, he 
asserts that because he attempted to recover back pay under the FMLA, Mr. Pryor, his 
manager, decided to review his personnel file and demand that he update the 
information supporting his accommodation requests. Mr. Harvey points to no evidence 
whatsoever in the record, and makes no inferential reference to any such evidence, 
which would reasonably indicate that the two events were related in any way. His bare 
assertion that “one thing led to the other” is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact for trial. Therefore, Wal-Mart is entitled to summary judgment on 
Mr. Harvey’s retaliation claim.
3. The FM LA and Failure to Notify Claims
Finally, we may return to Wal-Mart’s argument that Mr. Harvey was not an 
“eligible employee" under the FMLA, and therefore, was never entitled to enjoy the 
protections of the statute. Specifically, the defendant claims that Mr. Harvey did not 
work the requisite number of hours in the twelve month period prior to taking his second 
leave of absence. Aside from the arguments regarding equitable estoppel discussed 
above, Mr. Harvey attempts to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
accuracy of Wal-Mart’s payroll records, which clearly indicate that he had not worked 
the requisite number of hours. This he has failed to do.
One of the stated purposes of the FMLA is “to entitle employees to take 
reasonable leave for medical reasons ... and for the care of a child ... who has a serious
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health condition.” 29U.S.C. §2601(b)(2). However, there are essential prerequisites that 
an employee must satisfy in order to reap the benefits of this entitlement. To be 
protected by the provision of the FMLA, or in other words, to be considered an “eligible 
employee," an employee must have “been employed ... (i) for at least 12 months by the 
employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 102 [29 USCS § 2612]; 
and (ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 
12-month period. ” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A).14 If an employee fails to satisfy these threshold 
requirements, then the employee does not, by definition, fall within the protective 
umbrella of the statute, and further discussion of his “rights” under the FMLA is 
therefore moot.
Accordingly, Mr. Harvey has gone to significant effort to establish a triable fact 
issue regarding the accuracy of his pay records. We will analyze each of Mr. Harvey’s 
contentions, bearing in mind that “mere conclusory allegations ... are insufficient... to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Eason. 73 F.3d at 1325.
First, Mr. Harvey claims that Wal-Mart's payroll records reflect 263.19 hours of 
paid leave in 2004, which is not counted for purposes of determining an employee's 
eligibility under the FMLA. This calculation, Mr. Harvey contends, is inaccurate, 
because Mr. Harvey did not formally request leave during that year, but rather only 
requested a reduction of the number of days that he worked per week. While it is true 
that Mr. Harvey’s Request for Leave of Absence form does specify that he wished to
14 While Mr. Harvey does raise some argument as to Wal-Mart’s failure to notify him as to which method 
of calculating the preceding 12-month period would be used, this point appears to be irrelevant. There 
does not appear to be a 12-month period, by any measure, during which Mr. Harvey would have 
qualified under the statute.
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work only two days a week, this does not repudiate the explanation of the 263.19 hour 
figure offered by Wal-Mart. (Doc. 57-10, pp. 30-32, 57-59). Each category of paid leave 
is broken down, calculated, and accounted for. Mr. Harvey’s bald assertion that the 
records are “implausible” is plainly insufficient to draw the uncontested documents 
submitted by Wal-Mart into serious dispute.
Mr. Harvey next contends that the Wal-Mart official who gave the deposition 
testimony explaining Mr. Harvey’s employment records, Mr. Robert Davis ( “Mr. Davis"), 
did not have any personal knowledge of the accuracy of those records. It is true that 
Mr. Davis clearly stated during his deposition that he was not personally involved in any 
decisions involving Mr. Harvey’s employment. (Doc. 57-10, p. 12). However, he also 
stated that he reviewed Mr. Harvey’s employment records in preparation for his 
deposition testimony. Mr. Harvey has offered no evidence which would indicate that his 
review of those records was in any way tainted, flawed, or otherwise unreliable. Mr. 
Davis’s role was to explain the records, not to authenticate them. Mr. Harvey has not 
offered any evidence which would contradict the information contained in those records, 
and explained by Mr. Davis. Therefore, Mr. Harvey again fails to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact here.
Furthermore, Mr. Harvey uses calculations based upon Wal-Mart’s sick leave and 
Illness Protect Plan policies in an attempt to illustrate the possible inaccuracy of Wal- 
Mart’s payroll recordsin a general sense. However, these calculations simply fail to draw 
the payroll records offered by Wal-Mart into question. Once again, Mr. Davis’s 
deposition testimony, which explained the figures in some detail, is uncontroverted. Mr.
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Harvey has also presented no credible documentary or testimonial evidence which 
would draw these figures into question with regard to his own payroll records, and no 
such evidence relates to the other categories of paid leave counted against Mr. Harvey, 
such as holiday or personal time. Mr. Harvey challenges Wal-Mart's broad 
categorization of several categories of paid leave under one term, “OTH." But again, the 
various subclasses of this broad category were explained, and remain unchallenged. No 
genuine issue of material fact is presented by these arguments.
Finally, Mr. Harvey claims that the records should generally be considered 
inaccurate, because of some perceived irregularities between Mr. Harvey's earnings 
report for the year 2002 and the payroll records for that year. This argument, however, 
is irrelevant at the outset because it does not relate to a term of employment relevant to 
Mr. Harvey’s FMLA claim in this case.
In sum, Mr. Harvey has failed to offer a single piece of evidence which tends to 
show that he actually worked any number of hours for which Wal-Mart did not credit 
him. No pay stubs, receipts, or even testimony is referred to which would contradict, in 
a direct manner, the payroll records offered by Wal-Mart. The problem with Mr. Harvey’s 
contentions here is perhaps best encapsulated by a statement in his own pleadings, 
when counsel for Mr. Harvey asserts that “it is highly unlikely and implausible . . . that 
Mr. Harvey could have accrued or taken the amount of leave with which he was 
credited.” (Doc. 59-1, p. 9). No evidence is offered by Mr. Harvey of what he did or did 
not accrue, onlythis statement. This is preciselythe type of unsupported and conclusory 
allegation that is insufficient to survive summary judgment. See Eason. 73 F.3d at 1325.
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In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Mr. Harvey worked the requisite number of hours required 
to qualify as an “eligible employee" under the FMLA. This conclusion renders moot any 
further discussion of Mr. Harvey’s rights under the FMLA - by definition, at the time that 
he took the disputed leave of absence, he had no such rights.15
III. Conclusion
For the reasons described above, the Court finds that the defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
A  judgment in accord with this ruling will issue separately.
Mr. Harvey's claim that Wal-Mart failed in its duty to advise him of his rights under the FMLA. The 
Court agrees that recovery under the FMLA is appropriate when an employer's “noncompliance with 
the individualized notice regulations impaired [the plaintiffs] ability to exercise her rights under the 
FMLA and thereby caused her prejudice." Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 542 (5th Cir. 2007). 
However, even if there w as such an interference, Mr. Harvey had no rights under the FMLA with 
which to interfere, and thus, he cannot recover under this theory.
SIGNED on this of September, 2009 at Alexandria, Louisiana.
DEE D. DRELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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